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Abstract 
In this paper we carry over a static version of a New Keynesian Macromodel a la Clarida Gali 
Gertler (1999)  to a monetary union. We will show in particular that a harmonious functioning 
of a monetary union critically depends on the correlation of shocks that hit the currency area. 
Additionally a high degree of integration in product markets is advantageous for the ECB as it 
prevents that national real interest rates can drive a wedge between macroeconomic outcomes 
across member states. In particular small countries are vulnerable and therefore in need for 
fiscal policy as an independent stabilization agent with room to breath. 
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1  Introduction 
In this paper we apply a static version of a New Keynesian macro model a la (Clarida, Gali, 
and Gertler 1999) to a monetary union potentially describing EMU. Additionally the paper 
serves as a contribution to the optimal currency literature. It is a powerful alternative to the 
IS/LM-based Mundell Fleming (MF) model. The main advantage of the open economy new 
keynesian macromodel in its reduced form  is its ability to discuss the role of country specific 
inflation rates while the Mundell-Fleming model is based on the assumption of fixed prices. 
With the launch of the third stage of the common monetary policy in January 1999 the 
participating states of the European Monetary Union delegated monetary policy to an 
independent central bank that sets monetary conditions in line with the average 
macroeconomic environment in the union. The unique feature of a currency area is given by 
the fact that the different macroeconomic agents, the ECB, national governments and labour 
unions focus on different levels of target variables. The common central bank that is assumed 
to follow a strategy of flexible inflation targeting focuses on union wide aggregates. It sets the 
nominal interest rate i for the total currency area in accordance with its inflation target while 
equally having a concern for economic activity (see Svensson 2003). This means in particular 
that the interest r ate policy of the ECB will be indifferent against mean preserving 
distributions of macroeconomic outcomes across member states. By contrast, labour unions 
and in particular national governments basically focus on national aggregates. This 
constellation nests a free rider problematic that is well documented in literature (see for 
example Dixit and Lambertini, 2002). In particular, we will show that unsustainable policies 
that are not consistent with the inflation target of the ECB, e.g. unsustainable fiscal 
expansions, or overly ambitious wage demands lead to a boom in the home country whereas 
they inflict negative spill over effects o n the rest of the union. This calls for stringent rules. 
The Maastricht treaty led to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) whic h superimposes some 
broad guidelines on fiscal policy such as the 3% deficit criterion (see Bofinger, 2003b, for a 
critical review of the SGP). Our analysis will focus on the sustainability of fiscal policy and 
provide a rationale for the 3% deficit criterion as well as for its suspension. Among the rich 
universe of aspects we ask whether fiscal policy should be actively used for stabilizing 
economic shocks or whether the fiscal stance should be neutral irrespective of the current 
state of the economy.  
Throughout this section we will focus in particular on two aspects. First, we will show 
that life in a monetary union is easier if the law of one price holds. If product markets are 
highly integrated the hole currency area shows one common rate of inflation  p, and hence,   4 
one common real interest rate  ( ) i -p  which prevents that a further wedge can be driven 
between macroeconomic outcomes in the vague of demand shocks. Second, we will analyze a 
scenario in which all countries only produce non-tradables. Such a setting implies the 
existence of national inflation rates  i p  which translate into national real interest rates  ( ) i i -p  
that amplify shocks. In line with Dornbusch (1997) we show that restrictions on the fiscal 
instrument might be harmful under such a setting (see also Chari and Kehoe, 1998)
1. 
 
2  Monetary policy with a passive fiscal policy 
In this Section we assume that monetary policy is the only macroeconomic player i n a 
monetary union, i.e. national fiscal policies remain completely passive. This means in 
particular that only the central bank will respond with its instrument  – the nominal interest 
rate – to shocks in order to stabilize economic activity. We assume that monetary policy is 
guided by the following loss function: 
(1)  ( )
2 2
ECB0 Ly =p-p+l . 
The ECB tries to stabilize squared deviations of the inflation rate and the output gap 
from their target values respectively. The preference parameter  l  depicts the weight 
monetary policy attaches to stabilize the output gap versus stabilizing the inflation rate. This 
loss function is commonly used to map the strategy of flexible inflation forecast targeting 
(Svensson 1999). Additionally Woodford has shown that it can be derived as a quadratic 
approximation to a households expected utility problem in the same (dynamic) New 
Keynesian Macro Model (Woodford 2002).  
Hence it is the task of the common central bank to set the interest rate in response to 
exogenous disturbances and consistent with the structural equations of the model so that the 
loss function LECB is minimized. Note that the ECB only targets at euro wide averages, 
whereas it does not take care on the dispersion of goal variables across countries. In other 
words the ECB does not consider the spread as a problem as long as it is mean preserving. 
This means for example that the ECB is indifferent between the following two 
macroeconomic outcomes as depicted in Figure 1. This convention established in literature 
                                                   
1 Other related literature that adresses the issues of monetary and fiscal policy interaction in monetary union are: 
Dixit and Lambertini (2002), Beetsma a nd Jensen (2002), Benigno and Woodford (2003), Alesina et al. 
(2001), Mongelli (2002) and Muscatelli et al. (2002).   5 
(linear quadratic loss function in inflation and output) is to our understanding somewhat 
inconvenient. Nevertheless throughout the exposition we take it as granted that conventional 
wisdom says that the ECB should only take care of euro wide averages of the inflation rate 




Figure 1: Mean preserving distribution of macroeconomic outcomes 
y1=y2=0 -y1=y2>0 -y2=y1<0 y1=y2=0 -y1=y2>0 -y2=y1<0  
2.1    The law of one price holds 
Let us assume that in the monetary union only tradables are produced and that, in addition to 
that, the law of one price holds. Technically speaking, this latter assumption means in 
particular that the currency area is only hit by a common supply shock. Thus, the area-wide 
Phillips curve has the following structure: 
(2)  02 dy p=p++e . 
Obviously, as monetary conditions which are measured by  ( ) ri =-p  are identical for 
all member countries i, we can specify the IS relationship as follows:  
(3)  ( ) ii,1 yabi =--p+e . 
















Inserting the Phillips curve into the loss function and solving the optimization problem 
gives the average output gap: 







                                                   
2 Throughout the exposition we abstract from the problematic of a zero lower bound (Coenen Günter 2003). 
3 Note that the aggregate values in general are defined in an union consisting of n countries as:  1
n
i i xx
= = ￿ .   6 
Inserting (5) into the Phillips curve gives the solution for the area-wide inflation rate 
which only depends on supply shocks: 





Thus, on average the ECB can protect the union from demand shocks. Nevertheless, 
we will show that across countries there may be a great dispersion in output, even if the law 
of one price holds. Inserting the reduced form expressions of the inflation rate and the output 
gap into the IS relationsshop yields the following reduced form for the interest rate: 










Equation  (7) nicely depicts that the reaction to demand shocks does not depend on the 
preferences of the central bank whereas the reaction to supply shocks does. Inserting the 
inflation rate and the interest rate rule (7) into the national IS curve equation  (3) one can 
easily determine the output gap for country i as follows: 







Equation (8) signals the key difference between a closed economy like the US and a 
monetary union like EMU. Even if the average output gap is equal to zero, this can go hand in 
hand with a dispersion in national aggregates. Obviously non-synchronized demand shocks, 
that is  ( ) i,11 corr;1 ee„ , can drive a wedge between country specific output gaps. This can in 
the long run undermine the very existence of the union itself as each country would need 
notably different monetary conditions which is of course impossible by the very definition of 
a monetary union itself. To clarify this statement let us make the assumption of uncorrelated 
shocks, that is  ( ) i,11 corr;0 ee=, and equally sized countries. What happens if only country i is 
hit by a shock at time t? To illustrate this case let us assume that the GDP share of country i is   7 
a and  2 0 e= . Then we can rewrite the aggregate demand shock as the following weighted 
average
4: 
(9)  ( ) 1i,1i,1 1 - e=ae+-ae , 
where -i denotes all other countries but country i. Since we assume that country -
specific shocks are uncorrelated, that is  ( ) i,1i,1 corr,0 - ee= , the shock “observed” by the ECB 
is: 
(10)  1i,1 e=ae . 
Inserting equation (10) into (8), we can see that output in country i is given by: 
(11)  ( ) i,1i,1 y1 =-ae , 
whereas output in the rest of the union is equal to: 
(12)  i,1i,1 y- =-ae . 
Equations  (11) and  (12) depict the potential conflicts which might prevail in a 
monetary union. If the law of one price holds, shocks can never be destabilizing, but in the 
limit, when the GDP share of an individual member country is almost zero, the shock will be 
fully reflected in the country’s output gap. As a consequence of the positive demand shock in 
country i, output will be above its potential whereas the rest o f the union suffers from a 
somewhat depressed economic activity. Obviously, equation  (8) shows that asymmetric 
shocks are a major problem for small countries participating  in a union, as the real interest 
rate set by the ECB is not coined for a country with a low GDP weight unless  ii corr(;)1 - ee= . 
Therefore, as will be shown in Section  3.2, fiscal policy is needed above all in small countries 
in order to be able to compensate the impact of country specific shocks on the output gap and 
on the inflation rate.  
                                                   
4 The assumption that countries are equally sized is not as restrictive as it might seem at first glance. For every 






- ￿￿ += ￿￿
Łł
. Therefore  a can take 
arbitrary values between zero and 1.   8 
We can equally retrieve these results with the help of a graphical analysis (see Figure 
2). Country i is hit by a demand shock which shifts the IS curve from IS0 to IS1. As we 
assume that fiscal policy remains completely passive over the cycle, only the ECB reacts to 
demand shocks to the extend that they influence the average output gap of the euro area. The 
demand shock in country i translates into a shift of the euro area IS curve from IS0 to IS1 by 
( ) 1,i 1n e . As a reaction to this shift, the ECB will tighten monetary conditions from  0 r  to  1 r  in 
order to stabilize the demand shock on average. Nevertheless, as  Figure  2 shows, this 
“average” stabilization goes hand in hand with a dispersion of output across member states. 
Monetary conditions for country i will be too loose, giving a boost to economic activity so 
that output will be above its potential (yi > 0). By contrast, monetary conditions for the rest of 
the euro area will be to high resulting in a somewhat depressed economic environment 
( ) i y0 - < . 
 






































Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the 
sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 and 
d=0.34. 
 
2.2  Idiosyncratic Phillips curves 
Let us now assume that the country specific output is not tradable. Accordingly, the law of 
one price can be violated and each member state will be characterized by an idiosyncratic 
Phillips curve. Nevertheless, as we take idiosyncratic supply shocks to be i.i.d. distributed 
with mean zero and a constant variance, the conditional as well as the unconditional 
expectations of the inflation rate of the individual member states are identical. Given this 
assumption our set of equations can be stated as follows: 
(13)  i0ii,2 dy p=p++e    9 
(14)  iii,1 yab(i) =--p+e . 
Assuming that the ECB only targets averages, its optimization problem remains 
unchanged. In other words the aggregate values for the output gap and the inflation gap are 
identical to the previous scenario on average. Following this line of argumentation we can 
state in particular that the nominal euro wide interest rate is still given by: 










where  1 e  and  2 e  are weighted averages of the country specific shocks (see equation 
(9)). The output gap of country i is now given by:  







-- +l Œœ ºß
. 
Equation (16) shows that an uncorrelated demand shock  ( ) i,11 corr;1 ee„ can drive a 
wedge between national cycles. Additionally, the dispersion across national outputs is 
amplified by a factor of  ( ) ( ) 11bd -  compared to (8), the scenario where the law of one price 
holds. As we will see below this can be explained by diverging monetary conditions  ( ) i i -p  
across member states. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly equation (16) shows that supply shocks 
originating in country i give a boost to domestic economic activity whereas it is depressed  by 
union wide supply shocks. The argument goes as follows. A supply shock in country i gives a 
push to its inflation rate pi that lowers its real interest rate  ( ) i i -p . For instance, excessive 
wage demands that are transformed via mark up pricing in higher inflation rates in country i. 
This calls the ECB upon to act only insofar as the European inflation rate raises. Therefore, 
the expansionary impact of declining real interest rates in country i is not totally undone by 
subsequent raising nominal interest rates so that as net effect output will increase. Thus, the 
ECB can not punish individual member states by rising average real rates which clearly shows 
that stringent rules for labour unions as well as for national governments are a prerequisite for 
a well functioning monetary union, to prevent free rider behaviour and negative spill over 
effects for other member states. The inflation rate of country i is given by equation 17:   10 









The individual inflation rates in a monetary union can – in sharp contrast to a closed 
economy  – depend on demand shocks. Although the ECB will meet its inflation target on 
average this can go hand in hand with a significant dispersion in inflation rates across 
countries in the case of a demand shock. If we are dealing with a symmetric supply shock 
2,i2 e=e  the inflation rate will again be depicted by the equations (5) and (6). 
To further illustrate the results we calculate the monetary conditions in real terms for 
uncorrelated demand shocks. The real interest rate is given by  i ri =-p. Making use of the 
reduced form of the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate in country i we can compute 
real monetary conditions for country i as follows: 




















which translates into the following inflation rates: 













With equations (20) and (21) at hand we can easily compute the corresponding output gaps: 













.   11 
This set of equations depicts that if country i is hit by an uncorrelated demand shock 
and the ECB only cares about averages, than national outcomes may greatly diverge. 
Additionally, compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds the degree of 
dispersion in output is amplified by a factor of  ( ) 11bd -  as a consequence of diverging 
monetary conditions across countries. Hence, the previous two sections underline that from 
the perspective of monetary policy a higher degree of integration in product markets is 
favourable as the central bank can influence more directly the real interest rate in each 
country.  
In a scenario without fiscal policy it essentially depends on the size of the individual 
member state whether idiosyncratic shocks will be stabilizing or destabilizing. According to 
the Taylor principle, uncorrelated demand shocks will be destabilizing if real interest rates 
( ) i i -p  will not be raised. This will only be the case if (see equation  (18)) 
(24)  bd0bd a-<￿a< . 
Given our baseline calibration (b = 0.4 and d  = 0.34), equation  (24) indicates that 
idiosyncratic shocks will be  destabilizing if the GDP share of the individual country under 
consideration is smaller than approximately 14%. An intuition for this result is easy to find. 
As the ECB is the only macroeconomic agent that stabilizes shocks, it only reacts to euro 
wide averages. The smaller the individual country in size, the smaller the impact of an 
idiosyncratic shock on the currency area and hence the smaller the reaction of the ECB to this 
idiosyncratic shock. This underlines that by far most countries in EMU need fiscal policy as 
an independent institution in order to deal with asymmetric shocks. Some further intuition to 
these results can be given by taking a look at Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
Figure 3 depicts a scenario where country i is hit by a demand shock of size  1,i 3 e=. 
This translates into a shift of the IS curve from IS0 to IS1. In response to the boom in 
economic activity the ECB raises nominal interest rates from i 0 to i 1 inducing a change in 
economic activity that exactly compensates the impact of the initial demand shock on the euro 
wide economic activity. Hence, we arrive at the result that demand shocks can be totally 
stabilized for the currency are on average. Nevertheless this goes hand in hand with a 
dispersion on the national level. The increase in nominal rates leads to a decreased economic 
activity in the rest of the union. As the inflation rate is a shift parameter in the (y;i)- space the 
IS curve is shifted inwards in the rest of the union. In country i the boom in economic activity   12 
leads to an additional outward shift of the IS curve. As we already indicated the size of shifts 
critically depends on the GDP share of country i. 
 












































Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For the 
sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 and 
d=0.34. 
 
Figure  4 depicts a currency area when country i is hit by a supply shock of size 
2,i 3 e=. This translates into a shift of the aggregate inflation rate by a factor of  ( ) 22,i 1n e=e . 
Depending on preferences the ECB chooses its preferred stabilization mix on the aggregate 
level by setting nominal rates according to its preferences. This increase in euro wide nominal 
rates partially stabilizes the inflation rate in country i. The rest of the union suffers from a 
deflationary environment. Figure 4 impressively underlines that national real interest rates – if 
existent – can drive a massive wedge between national outcomes and call for stringent rules 
that prevent unsustainable policies in individual member states which inflict negative spill 
over effects for the rest of the union. Additionally, the Figures display that we need fiscal 
policy as an additional macroeconomic agent in order to stabilize idiosyncratic shocks. The 
impact of the negative spill-over effect depends again on the GDP share of country i. 
   13 







































Note Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
 
3  Monetary and fiscal policy interaction 
In the previous Section we modelled  a monetary union when monetary policy is the only 
macroeconomic agent that actively stabilizes shocks. We basically saw for the two possible 
specifications of a Phillips curve that life in a monetary union is easier if shocks are correlated 
and product markets are integrated. In this Section we introduce a fiscal authority in each 
member state that is guided by a loss function and which has g, the fiscal stance parameter, as 
its only instrument. The stance of fiscal policy is defined as expenditures minus revenues. 
Hence if g  > 0, the fiscal stance is expansionary, and if g  < 0, the fiscal stance is 
contractionary.  
3.1  The loss function of fiscal authorities 
We assume that national fiscal authorities are guided by the following loss function:5  
(25) 
22
G,iii Lyg =+j . 
Each government is interested in stabilizing output around its potential. The second 
term in the loss function captures the  notion that governments behavior might be motivated 
for instance by the treaty of Maastricht that penalizes excessive (downward) movements in 
the fiscal stance parameter g. Additionally, if g would be permanently larger than zero the 
                                                   
5 Note that we implicitely assume that both macroeconomic agents have an identical output target. For diverging 
targets see Dixit and Lambertini (2001).   14 
solution would exhibit some unpleasant debt arithmetic’s as the fiscal balance exhibits a 
structural deficit.
6 j scales the costs of using the fiscal policy instrument. 
As a specific characteristic of a monetary union, the common central bank targets at 
union wide aggregates wh ereas the individual governments focus on national aggregates. This 
set-up nests possible conflicts as the ECB can only on average meet its targets which is likely 
to go hand in hand, depending on the correlation of country specific shocks, with a greatest 
dispersion in the individual target variables under consideration in each member state. The 
question we will answer now is to what extend fiscal policy can prevent national outcomes 
from diverging across the currency area.
7 Hence, we will look to what extend national fiscal 
policies can mitigate asymmetric shocks. 
3.2  The law of one price holds  
Let us assume that the law of one price holds. Then the Phillips curve for all countries is 
given by: 
(26)  02 dy p=p++e . 
Hence the commodity bundles produced in each country are perfect substitutes with a 
common inflation rate p. The currency union has only one common real interest rate ri =-p. 
Additionally, the union is hit only by a common supply shock. The second building bloc of 
the model is the IS-equation: 
(27)  ( ) iii,1 yabig =--p+k+e . 
Aggregate demand now also depends on the fiscal stance parameter. We assume that 
g = gopt. Hence g is set in order to minimize the loss function of fiscal policy. Given the 















                                                   
6 For a paper that focuses more strongly on  the political interaction between the national governments and a 
common central bank see Hallett et al. (1999). 







=￿ . As the optimization problem is unaltered, the ECB determines the overall 
inflation rate and the output gap as follows: 












Equations (29) and (30) underline that the ECB is the dominating actor of the game as 
it can push its preferred bliss point through. In other words, it can always completely offset 











This reaction function specifies the optimal nominal interest rate if governments of the 








Łł ￿  on average. It depicts the optimal response of the 
central bank to the average current stance of fiscal policy across the currency area. Equation 
(31) is characterized by the following features: In the absence of macroeconomic shocks 
12 0 e=e= the ECB will s et interest rates equal to their long run equilibrium value 
( ) 0 iab =+p  which corresponds to a union wide output gap of zero and an inflation rate that 
is equal to the inflation target. The global response to demand shocks in a union compared to 
a scenario of a closed economy is on average unaltered and given by  ( ) 1 i1b D=e . Again, the 
response to supply shocks depends on preferences. 












                                                   
8 Note that we do not intend to model alliances between individual member states (see van Aarle et al., 2002). 
For an analysis that includes the real exchange rate in the strategic analysis between the central bank and the 
government see Leitemo (2003).   16 
Solving this optimization problem we arrive at the following relationship depicting the 
way according to which fiscal  policy is conducted: 







It shows that the goverment reacts to the current stance of monetary policy and to 
country specific demand shocks. Concerning the reaction to the current stance of monetary 
policy equation (33) exhibits the following features: The partial derivative of g with respect to 
( ) ri =-p  is  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 grb0 ¶¶=kk+j>. Hence, if monetary policy gets more restrictive 
the government will switch to a more expansionary stance. The higher the weight on 
stabilizing its instrument (j ), the lower will be the strategic interaction between the two 
macroeconomic agents. Concerning the reaction to demand shocks equation (33) shows that 
following e.g. a n egative demand shock e1, fiscal policy will become more expansionary. 
Note that in contrast to monetary policy the government does not face a lower bound. Hence, 
g can become negative. The strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities 
results from the fact that the ECB responds to union-wide averages: 
(34)  ( ) 1i,1i,1 1 - e=ae+-ae . 
If only country i is hit by a demand shock, this triggers a feedback mechanism as all 
member countries have to share the adjustment burden of higher interest rates. The extend of 
the strategic feedback depends on the GDP share a of country i. Nevertheless, to simplify the 
exposition, we will assume equal GDP shares in the following. 
Given the reaction function of n fiscal authorities and the ECB we can easily compute 
the reduced form solution as we have n  + 1 unknowns  ( ) 1n g;...;g;i  and n  + 1 reaction 
functions. Inserting (29) and (33), averaging and plugging the resulting expression into (31) 
we get the following reduced form equation for the interest rate: 











In the absence of macroeconomic shocks ( 12 0 e=e= ) the ECB will set interest rates 
equal to their long run equilibrium value  ( ) 0 iab =+p  which corresponds to a union wide 
output gap of zero and an inflation rate that is equal to the inflation target. The global   17 
response to monetary shocks in a union compared to a scenario of a closed economy is on 
average unaltered and given by  ( ) 1 i1b D=e .  
The reduced form for the fiscal stance parameter can be computed by inserting the 
inflation rate and the interest rate into the reaction function of the central bank: 









Equation  (36) displays the difference between a closed and open economy set-up. 
First, we see that fiscal authorities have a stabilization task in response to demand shocks as 
long as these exhibit a degree a asymmetry. Second, as individual shocks are assumed to be 






ee ￿￿ k Łł ￿  that the 3% deficit criterion 
cannot be met. In other words, if the size of the shocks is large, (36) clearly demonstrates that 
even under an optimal and sustainable fiscal stance (defined as g = 0 in the absence of shocks) 
the Maastricht deficit criterion is likely to be violated with some positive probability. 
Nevertheless, as long as the violation stems from the size of exogenous shocks and not from a 
fiscal policy that is conducted in an unsustainable fashion (g > 0) the violation of the 
Maastricht criterion is a necessary precondition to restore the overall optimal outcome. 
Exactly for that reason the 3% deficit criterion can be suspended if a country is hit by large 
shocks, so that  ( ) 12 ;3 i g ee ‡ . 
Inserting  (35) and  (36) into the IS-curve equation we arrive at the following 
expression for the country specific output gap: 








Note that given a standard parameterization  ( ) 0.5 k=j= , uncorrelated demand 
shocks are likely to have a smaller impact on the overall economic activity compared to a 
scenario were fiscal policy remains passive. So indeed we can state that a Keynesian 
stabilization policy is able to dampen economic cycles compared to a policy that sets g = 0.
9 
Nevertheless the stabilization of shocks will not be perfect. The argument goes as follows. 
Assume that only one country is hit by a negative demand shock. Obviously, given the Nash   18 
equilibrium, monetary conditions measured in real terms  ( ) i -p  will be to restrictive for that 
country to restore an output in line with potential  ( ) i y0 < . By contrast, monetary conditions 
for the rest of the union will be too loose giving a boost to economic activity ( i y0 - > ). At 
first glance this result might seem at odds with intuition. One might ask why fiscal authorities 
do not use their instrument more rigorously in response to demand shocks in the equilibrium. 
The key to this answer lies in the strategic interaction between the agents. A more 
expansionary fiscal policy triggers higher interest rates for the currency area so that the 
marginal costs of an expansionary fiscal policy outweigh the marginal benefits.  
The degree of conflicting potential can be summarized by the correlation between the 
idiosyncratic demand shocks versus the eurowide average  ii corr(;) - ee . Equation (37) depicts 
that in a union where demand shocks are perfectly correlated  ii corr(;)1 - ee=  the output gaps 
of individual member states y i are identical at each point in time. Obviously a maximum 
dispersion in output will be given if  ii corr(;)1 - ee=- . Then, the individual output gaps y i 
would exhibit a maximum dispersion which could potentially undermine the existence of the 
union in the long run as at each point in time country i finds it beneficial – evaluated in terms 
of  G,i L   – to leave the union as it requires significantly different monetary conditions. 
Therefore, our simple static analysis clearly makes the prediction that if the law of one price 
holds, life within a monetary union is easier if demand shocks are highly correlated and if 
fiscal policy is actively engaged in the stabilization of shocks. Additionally, the exposition 
provided a rationale for the suspension of the 3% deficit criterion in the vague of large shocks 
as a necessary condition for fiscal policy to be conducted optimally.  
It is important to note that if we set  0 j=  shocks can be completely stabilized. In 
other words, if fiscal policy does not put any weight on smoothing its instrument it is possible 
to completely offset uncorrelated demand shocks. Nevertheless the smoothing objective is a 
common theme in literature. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 For a critical view that stresses that fiscal shocks itself might be a source of dispersion in output see for 
instance Canova and Pappa (2003).   19 








































Note Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
 
We can present the same results with the help of a graphical analysis. Let us assume 
that country i is hit by an uncorrelated demand shock. The shock shifts the IS curve from IS0 
to IS 1. As a result, the aggregate European IS shifts from IS0 to IS1. As the ECB can stabilize 
shocks on average, it will raise nominal interest rates from i0 to i1 which brings output back to 
its potential  and the inflation rate to the inflation target. The new nominal rate depresses 
economic activity in the rest of the union so that fiscal policy becomes expansionary which 
leads to an outward shift of the IS curve. In country i the increase in nominal rates is to small 
so that fiscal policy will become contractionary leading to an inward shift of the IS0 curve. 
3.3    Idiosyncratic Phillips curves 
In this Section we analyze the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities in 
a monetary union if the law of one price does not hold. We will again focus on uncorrelated 
idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks. As already shown in Section  2.2 the existence of 
country specific real interest rates drives a further wedge between macroeconomic outcomes 
compared to a scenario where the law of one price holds. Nevertheless, we will show that 
fiscal policy has stabilizing effects on the performance of member countries. Like in Section 
2.2  the Phillips curve can be specified as: 
(38)  i0ii,2 dy p=p++e . 
This means in particular that each country only produces non-tradable commodities. 
Note that this assumption does not mean that the country specific inflation rates can diverge 
arbitrarily over time, as we take non-autocorrelated shocks to be the workhorse through out   20 
our exposition. The inflation rate in country i is driven by the country specific output gap  i (y)  
and the idiosyncratic supply shock  i,2 e , e.g. non-sustainable wage policies. With equation 
(38) we effectively reintroduce country specific real interest rates. The government in the 











The reaction function of fiscal policy can than be stated as follows: 







In order to solve the game we impose symmetry, we assume that not only the 
coefficients in the country specific Phillips curves and the IS curves are identical, but also that 
the countries are of equal size. Consequently, averaging over the fiscal stance parameter 
results in: 
(41)  [ ]









With equation (41) at hand we get the following reduced form expression for the interst rate: 











Most notably equation (42) is identical to the reduced form we already saw in Section 
3.2 . This cannot come as a surprise as the averages of the variables under consideration 
(output gap, fiscal stance parameter) from the perspective of the ECB are identical under both 
scenarios. Hence, from the viewpoint of monetary policy it does not matter whether the 
supply side of the economy is characterized by only one or many Phillips curves as long as 
the ECB only cares about shocks and is indifferent  between mean preserving spreads. The 
fiscal stance parameter is given by: 
(43)  ( ) i111,i2i,232 gqqq =e-e+e+e , 
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Fiscal policy exhibits a higher level of activity compared to a scenario where the law 
of one price holds as q 1 is larger than the corresponding coefficient in equation  (36). This 
shows that fiscal policy needs to become more counter cyclical as country specific real rates 
( i i -p ) amplify shocks that hit the individual economies. A negative demand shock 
originating in the own country leads to a fiscal expansion, whereas a negative output shock in 
the other member states leads to a contraction in the own fiscal stance parameter. This nicely 
depicts that the ECB will relax monetary conditions which would give a boost to output in 
country j if fiscal policy would not contract. This result clearly shows the macroeconomic 
assignment which is nested in the Nash equilibrium. Demand shocks are mainly stabilized by 
the ECB and not – as one might  expect – by the individual member states. As expected a 
foreign inflation shock leads to a more expansionary fiscal stance since the government is 
only concerned about output and not about inflation. Therefore, as a response to tighter 
monetary conditions for the whole area, the fiscal stance becomes more expansionary. These 
results are qualitatively identical to those we already saw in Section 3.2. 
The output gap equation is given by:
10 
(44)  ( ) i5i,11627i,2 yqqq =e-e+e+e  
where 







                                                   
10 Note if we set  i,11 e=e and  i,22 e=e , hence if the currency area is hit by symmetric shocks then equation (44) 
simplifies to (30).   22 
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Note, in particular, that given our standard calibration  ( ) 0.5,d0.34,b0.4 k=j=== , 
the stabilization of idiosyncratic demand shocks is only partial compared to a scenario where 
the law of one price holds. This underlines again that diverging real interest rates ( i i -p ) 
amplify shocks. Accordingly, by the very definition of a (stable) Nash equilibrium fiscal 
policy has no incentive to deviate from the final outcome of the game as otherwise monetary 
policy would have an incentive to raise real interest rates. Again, we come to the result that a 
country specific supply shock, e.g. wage demands that are not consistent with the inflation 
target of the ECB ( 0 w D>p ) lead to an increase in domestic inflation and to a drop in 
national real interest rates. Thus, the ECB cannot punish individual member states which calls 
for a wage policy that is consistent with the inflation target of the ECB. For a foreign and an 
aggregate supply shock we come to the same results as in Section 2.2. But again, the analysis 
shows that fiscal policy as an independent agent is able to stabilize the impact of supply 
shocks. So indeed, as in the case of demand shocks, equation (41) clearly demonstrates the 
advantageous of a Keynesian stabilization policy that significantly reduces the impact of 
supply and demand shocks on the macroeconomic goal variables. To complete the reduced 
form description of the economy we present the inflation rate which  is given by the following 
expression:
11 
(45)  ( ) i08i,119210i,2 qqq p=p+e-e+e+e  
where 
q8=









                                                   
11 Note if we set  i,11 e=e and  i,22 e=e , hence if the currency area is hit by symmetric shocks then equation (45) 
simplifies to (29).   23 
q9= ( ) ( )



















The reduced form inflation rate is characterized by the following features. In the 
absence of macroeconomic shocks that hit the euro area the individual inflation rate will be 
equal to the inflation target. Demand shocks will only have an impact on the idiosyncratic 
inflation rate to the extend that they are uncorrelated. Compared to a scenario where only 
monetary policy takes care of shocks, the introduction of a Keynesian stabilization policy 
opt gg =  reduces the impact of demand shocks on the inflation rate and the output gap. The 
same dramatic decrease (given our standard calibration) can be recorded following 
idiosyncratic supply shocks.  
Let us illustrate the results of this Section. Country i is hit by a positive demand shock 
of size  i,1 3 e= which gives a massive boost to economic activity in that country given 
unchanged monetary conditions (p serves as a shift parameter). The IS curve in country i 
shifts from IS0 to IS1. Nevertheless the idiosyncratic shock in country i translates into an 
average euro -wide shock of size ( ) 1 1n e . This calls the ECB upon to act. As we already saw 
in the case of demand shocks, the ECB can always maintain its bliss point. Accordingly, it 
will tighten monetary conditions and raise real interest rates from i 0 to i1  which induces a 
change in economic activity for the whole currency area that exactly compensates the initial 
demand shock. As output on average will be back to potential for the currency area, the 
inflation rate will equally return to the inflation target. Nevertheless, the policy stance in 
country i will be too loose. By contrast, for the rest of the union monetary conditions will be 
too tight resulting in a somewhat depressed economic activity. Accordingly, the inflation rate 
in the country that was hit by the initial demand shock will be above the inflation target of the 
ECB whereas i nflation in the rest of the union will be below the ECB’s inflation target. But 
remember for the union as a whole inflation will be back to target. This result nicely depicts 
that the common central bank is indifferent when it comes to mean preserving 
macroeconomic outcomes. Given this global picture we still need to look at the behaviour of 
the individual member states in equilibrium. Obviously the government in country i initiates a 
fiscal contraction as output is above its potential shifting the IS-curve inward. In the rest of   24 
the union the governments relax the fiscal stance in order to stabilize economic activity 
shifting the IS curve outward. The degree of strategic interaction critically depends on the size 
of country i. Compared to a scenario where monetary policy is the only stabilizing actor fiscal 
authorities succeed in partially stabilizing the output as depicted in  Figure  6. Given this 
sequence of shifts we arrive at a final policy outcome in response to the idiosyncratic demand 
shock that is described by the following features. In country i output will be above potential 
and the inflation rate will be higher than the inflation target. In the rest of the union the 
economic environment is characterized by the opposite picture. Output will be below 
potential and inflation will be below its target level. As in the case of a closed economy, the 
shock will be stabilized on average. 
 














































Note Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
 
Figure 7 and Figure 8 depict what happens if country i is hit by an idiosyncratic supply 
shock. Assume that country i is hit by a supply shock of size  i,2 3 e= . As in the case of a 
closed economy the ECB determines the overall outcome of the game depending on 
preferences l by setting the nominal interest rate accordingly. Equations (29) and (30) depict 
the u nion wide outcomes that will prevail given an aggregate supply shock of size 
( ) i,2i,2 1n e=e . For l equal to 0.5 we can see that the inflation rate will increase to 2.81% and 
the output gap will drop to a level of –0.55%. Now the interesting question is how this global 
outcome translates into national macroeconomic performances. Obviously the rest of the 
union will suffer from a recession as it will face higher real interest rates which translate into 
a negative output gap. Therefore, we will move along the Phillips curve to a point that is 
characterized by a lower output and a lower inflation rate. In the rest of the union the fiscal   25 
stance is expansionary to (partially) unwind the effects of the contractionary monetary stance. 
For country i itself the massive increase in inflation by 3% leads to almost unchanged real 
rates so that fiscal policy is somewhat contractionary to prevent real interest rats from 
decreasing.  Figure  7 nicely maps the ‘dynamics’ captured in a static version of a New 
Keynesian macro model. Supply shocks are only contractionary on average to the extend that 
monetary policy reacts to them. As the massive inflationary shock only translates by (1/n) on 
the aggregate the reaction of the E CB for that individual country will be far too weak to 
contract economic activity. Within a monetary union, labour unions can potentially hide 
behind the (1/n)-effect as the ECB cannot ‘punish’ a particular country for a wage policy that 
is not in line with its inflation target. 
 








































Note Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. 
For the sake of illustration we  have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 
and d=0.34. 
 
Of course we can equally  evaluate supply shocks by mapping the strategic interaction 
between the agents in the y-i space. Given that the policy of the ECB is conducted optimally 
we have to take into account that the inflation rate as well as the fiscal stance parameter serves 
as a shift factor in the y-i space. Given the initial supply shock in country i the IS curve will 
shift due to the increase in economic activity by  bDp . This shift in economic activity is 
translated into a shift of the IS curve by a factor of  ( ) 1nb Dp. Now the ECB steps in and 
chooses its preferred stabilization mix taking the reaction of fiscal authorities appropriately 
into account. Given the ECB’s preferences it will raise nominal interest rates and induce a 
stabilizing recession in order to minimize its loss function. This move by the ECB triggers an 
expansionary fiscal stance in the rest of the monetary union and a somewhat contractionary 
stance in country i. The overall policy outcome is depicted in Figure 8. 
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 Note: The figure maps the situation in which the monetary union consists of three countries of equal size. For 
the sake of illustration we have used concrete numerical values. As baseline calibration we have set b=0.4 and 
d=0.34. 
 
Finally to demonstrate the advantages of a Keynesian  stabilization policy we can 
compute real monetary conditions for individual member states in the event of asymmetric 
demand shocks. Making use of the reduced form, the real interest rate for country i that was 
hit by the shock can be written as: 











With the help of equation (46) we can see that shocks will not be destabilizing unless 
(47) 
2 bd k-j a£
j
. 
Given our standard parameterization this will not be the case unless  0.8% a< . (47) 
shows that only Luxembourg and Ireland are in the neighbourhood of such a threshold value. 
Accordingly, the analysis clearly demonstrates the advantageous of a Keynesian stabilization 
policy that dramatically reduces the risk that shocks will be amplified. 
4  Conclusion 
In this paper we applied a static version of a New Keynesian Macro Model a la (Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler 1999) to a currency union. We focussed in particular on the impact of 
asymmetric shocks and the integration of product markets and its implication for the well 
functioning of a currency union. Our results are very easy to state: Life within a monetary 
union is much easier if shocks are highly correlated and product markets are integrated. Under 
such a scenario shocks that hit the area are unlikely to be amplified across individual member   27 
states as the ECB can within an inflation targeting regime easily deal with global shocks. 
Additionally we find that in particular small countries are in a vulnerable position as the ECB 
almost neglects their idiosyncratic situations unless shocks are correlated. This is of course a 
strong argument for a Keynesian stabilization policy that actively fights shocks to stabilize 
economic activity. We showed that by this very argument one can provide a strong rationale 
for the suspension of the 3% deficit criterion in the vague of asymmetric demand and supply 
shocks that hit individual countries as a necessary precondition to restore optimal outcomes. 
Our analysis showed that in order to avoid negative spill over effects stringent rules are 
necessary in order to prevent national governments as well as national labour unions to 
conduct a beggar-my-neighbour policy. Therefore the grandfathers of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) were right to implement rules that endorse a sustainable fiscal stance in 
each member state. 
.  28 
Appendix I: Phillips curve with tradable and non-tradable sector  
Let us now discuss a third scenario which nests the two previously derived solutions as corner 
cases. We assume that each country has a tradable and a non-tradable sector. Therefore the 
consumer price inflation is given by a weighted average of the two product bundles: 
(48)  ( )
CPITNT
ii 1 p=ap+-ap . 
In each sector – tradables and nontradables – the inflation rate is determined by the difference 
between increases in nominal wages minus productivity: 
(49)  iiii wprod p=-+e . 
It is generally assumed that the productivity growth qi in those sectors that face international 
competition is larger than in those sectors that only produce for domestic markets, hence 
qi > vi. To simplify the exposition we assume that in each sector wages are negotiated 
separately. Very much in line with a static version of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) we assume 
that the nominal wage is determined as: 
(50) 
T
ii0 wqdy -=p+    
(51) 
NT
ii0i wvdy -=p+ .   
Hence the union in each sector negotiates wages above productivity that are consistent with 
the inflation target of the ECB. Additionally, workers’ wages depend on the state of the cycle. 
It seems plausible to assume that wage changes depend on overall activity as the sector 
specific characteristics are already taken into account by q i and v i. Wage changes that face 
international competition are assumed to depend on the overall cycle in the union, whereas 




02 dy p=p++e ,   
(53) 
NTNT
i0ii,2 dy p=p++e .   
Inserting leads to the following expression for consumer price inflation (CPI):   29 










   
Note that this specification nests the two corner solutions discussed in Sections 2 and 3. If the 
law of one price holds (a = 1), the Phillips curve is given by:  
(55) 
CPIT
i02 dy p=p++e . 
If each country only produces a non-tradable commodity bundle ( a = 0), the Phillips curve 
can be written as:  
(56) 
CPINT
i0ii,2 dy p=p++e . 
We now turn to the specification of the demand side. The static version of the usual IS 
equation can be specified as in the previous sections: 
(57)  ( )
CPI
iii1 yabig =--p+k+e . 
In each member state the political party in power faces the following optimization problem: 










Solving gives the following reaction function: 







The union wide output gap is given by:  
(60) 










and the union wide inflation rate can be calculated as: 










The reaction function of the interest rate is given by:   30 













which underlines that the interest rate setting behaviour is equal under the two scenarios 
previously considered. This result cannot come as a surprise as the ECB only reacts to euro-
wide averages, which are  identical under the two scenarios as the shocks are i.i.d. This 
underlines that the behavior of the ECB remains unaltered. 
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( ) ( )
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Applying the usual solving strategy we get the following reduced form equations for 
consumer price inflation 
(64)
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and the output gap  
(65) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )






























The fiscal stance parameter which nests the two corner solutions:   31 
(66) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )






















Appendix II: Tables for Figures 
Table 1: GDP weights  
Country  EU11 
Belgium  3.3 
Germany  29.9 
Greece  2,6 
Spain  10.9 
France  20.5 
Ireland  1.3 
Italy  19.2 
Luxembourg  0.3 
Netherlands  5.4 
Austria  3.2 
Portugal  2.1 
Finland  1.6 
Data were taken from (ECB 2003). 
 
 
Table 2: Monetary Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock (e 1,i = 3) Figure 50 
  Country one  Country two  Country three  Initial levels 
Interest rate  7.5  7.5  7.5  5 
Output gap  2  -1  -1  0 
Fiscal stance  /  /  /  0 
Inflation rate  2  2  2  2 
Real interest rate  5.5  5.5  5.5  3 
 
Table 3: Monetary Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock (e 1,i = 3) Figure 51 
  Country one  Country two  Country three  Initial levels 
Interest rate  7.5  7.5  7.5  5 
Output gap  2.31  -1.16  -1.16  0 
Fiscal stance  0  0  0  0 
Inflation rate  2.79  1.61  1.61  2 
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Table 4: Monetary Policy: Many Prices: Supply Shock (e1,i = 3) Figure  52 
  Country one  Country two  Country three  Initial 
levels/averages 
Interest rate  7.19  7.19  7.19  5 
Output gap  0.37  -1.02  -1.02  0 
Fiscal stance  0  0  0  0 
Inflation rate  5.15  1.68  1.66  2 
Real interest rate  2.07  5.53  5.53  3 
 
Table 5: Fiscal Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock (e1,i = 3) Figure 53 
  Country one  Country two  Country three  Initial levels 
Interest rate  7.5  7.5  7.5  5 
Output gap  1.33  -0.66  -0.66  0 
Fiscal stance  -1.33  0.66  0.66  0 
Inflation rate  2  2  2  2 
Real interest rate  5.5  5.5  5.5  3 
 
Table 6: Fiscal Policy: Many Prices: Demand Shock (e1,i = 3) Figure  54 
  Country one  Country two  Country three  Initial levels 
Interest rate  7.5  7.5  7.5  5 
Output gap  1.46  -0.73  -0.73  0 
Fiscal stance  -1.46  0.73  0.73  0 
Inflation rate  2.50  1.75  1.75  2 
Real interest rate  5.00  5.75  5.75  3 
 
Table 7: Fiscal Policy: Many Prices: Supply Shock (e1,i = 3) Figure 55/ Figure  55 
  Country one  Country two  Country three  Initial levels 
Interest rate  7.88  7.88  7.88  5 
Output gap  0.03  -0.85  0.85  0 
Fiscal stance  -0.46  0.42  0.42  0 
Inflation rate  5.01  1.71  1.71  2 
Real interest rate  2.87  6.17  6.17  3 
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Appendix III: Tables for comparison 
 
Table 8: Comparison of impact coefficients in the event of idiosyncratic demand shocks  e1,i  
  Only Monetary Policy  Montary and Fiscal Policy   
  Law of one Price  Many Phillips Curves  Law of One Price  Many Phillips Curves 











  yi 
Calibrated  1  1.16  0.67  0.73 










Calibrated  /  /  0.67  0.73 
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Table 9: Comparison of impact coefficients in the event of idiosyncratic supply shocks e2,i  
  Only Monetary Policy  Monetary and Fiscal Policy   
  Law of one Price  Many Phillips Curves  Law of One Price  Many Phillips Curves 
General  /  ( )
b
1bd -
  /  ( )
b
1bd -
  yi 
Calibrated  /  0.4629  /  0.29 
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Table 10: Comparison of impact coefficients in the event of global supply shocks  e2  
  Only Monetary Policy  Monetary and Fiscal Policy   





















  yi 
Calibrated  -0.55  -1.02  -0.55  -0.55 










  gi 
Calibrated  /  /  0.55  0.55 
General  2 d
l
+l
  2 d
l
+l
  2 d
l
+l





Calibrated  -0.81  -0.81  -0.81  -0.81 
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Appendix I V: Alternative assumptions about real interest rates and fiscal 
policy 
Quite naturally each theoretical model critically depends on the assumptions one makes about 
the functioning of the economy. In order to check the robustness of our results which we have 
derived throughout the main part of the text we want to alter our set of assumptions along two 
dimensions. First, we illustrate the effects of introducing the Fisher equation in the IS-curve 
instead of the (ex-post) real interest rate. Second, we analyze the consequences if each 
government in country i internalizes its impact on the  euro-wide inflation rate. To shorten the 
appendix we only calculate the most complicated case for each alternative assumption, that is 
monetary and fiscal policy interaction when the law of one price does not hold. 
 
Introducing the Fisher equation 
Following other strands of the literature (see for example Uhlig, 1999) we introduce the Fisher 
equation into the IS-curve which defines the nominal interest rate as the sum of the real interest 
rate and the expected inflation rate:  
 
e ir =+p. 
The IS equation can then be written as: 
  ( ) ,1
e
ii yabig pke =--++ .   
In order to simplify the exposition we assume – without loss of generality – that the inflation 
target of the central bank is equal to zero  ( ) 0 0 p= . Accordingly, we can state the Phillips curve 
as follows: 
  2 dy p=+e .   
Let us assume that the private sector builds rational expectations according to the following loss 
function: 
  ( ) ( )
2 ee L =pp-p .     37 
Hence, the private sector is happy if it anticipates the inflation rate correctly at the outset of the 
game (i.e. before any shocks occur), which boils down to the following equation: 
 
e
0 0 p=p= .   
Given this somewhat altered structure of the economy the ECB mimises its loss function 
 
22
ECB Ly =p+l    
subject to the aggregate Phillips curve which translates into the following average area wide 
output gap: 






.   
Inserting the output gap into the Phillips curve yields the following expression for the inflation 
rate: 




.   
Making use of this assumption as well as on the timing of the game we arrive at the following 
nominal interest rate rule: 








.   
Note that this equation is exactly equal to the one we derived in Chapter Fehler! Verweisquelle 
konnte nicht gefunden werden.. This cannot come as a surprise as a nominal instrument rule 
that targets zero inflation should be identical to a monetary policy that targets the real interest 
rate. Let us now turn to the optimization problem of the fiscal authorities. The government faces 
the following optimisation problem: 
 
22
G,iii Lyg =+j    
s.t.:   38 
  ( )
e
iiii,1 yabig =--p+k+e .   
Given the assumptions we have made on the private sector and its way according to which 
expectations are formed it holds that in each member state 
e
i 0 p= . Making use of this result the 
reaction function of fiscal policy can be stated as follows: 






.   
Taking expectations of the average fiscal stance parameter g i and inserting it into the reaction 
function of monetary policy we arrive at the following reduced form expression for the interest 
rate: 









,   
which can be used to solve for the fiscal stance parameter, 








   
the output gap in the individual member country i, 
 








   
and the corresponding inflation rate in member country i: 





j Øø p=e-e++le-e ºß k+j+l
.   
In order to shortly evaluate the plausibility of the results one can see that if shocks are 
symmetrical, i.e.  ( ) i,11 ;1 ree=  and  ( ) i,22 ;1 ree= , than the equations simplify to: 
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.   
As this setup may be a natural alternative to the structure of the economy as assumed throughout 
the main Part of the text let us give some comments on the results: 
•  Demand shocks only have an impact on the average macroeconomic outcomes if they are 
not synchronized. 
•  In the absence of shocks the output gap will be equal to zero and the inflation rate will be 
equal to the inflation target.  
•  The model setup is internally consistent because the country specific equations boil down 
to the euro area equations in the case of synchronized  supply and demand shocks. 
Nevertheless one result dramatically changed. As we assume that instead of the actual real 
interest rate the expected real interest rate matters, real interest rates are de facto equal across 
countries. Hence we do have no longer the phenomenon that country specific real interest rates 
can drive a wedge between country specific macroeconomic outcomes. In the main part of the 
text we saw that a dispersion across national outcomes could be amplified by diverging monetary 
conditions. By assuming that the real interest rate is derived from the Fisher equation this 
scenario is ruled as 
e
i p  is always zero. 
 
Alternative assumptions on the optimisation problem of fiscal authorities 
In this part of the Appendix we want to illustrate that the results derived in the main text are 
qualatively the same, irrespectively whether we assume that the government in country i 
internalizes the Phillips curve. Internalizing the Phillips curve means that the government takes 
the effects its own actions on the euro wide inflation rate into account. As in the previous 
sections we assume that the ECB solves the following optimization problem: 
 
22
CB Ly =p+l    
s.t. 
  02 dy p=p++e .   
Using this setup we arrive at the following reduced-form equation for the inflation rate: 




,     40 
which translates into the following output gap equation: 






,   










.   
Let us now turn to fiscal policy. As a novelty compared to the analysis in Chapter 3 we assume 
that the government in country i internalizes the effects of its individual actions on the euro-area 
wide inflation  rates: 
 
22
G,iii Lyg =+j    
s.t.: 
  iiii,1 yab(i)g =--p+k+e    
  i0ii,2 dy p=p++e .   










.   
Given this somewhat altered optimization problem we arrive at the following reduced forms for 
the interest rate: 
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the reduced form output gap parameter: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )











,   
and the inflation rate: 
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( ) ( )
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In order to shortly evaluate the plausibility of the results one can see that if shocks are 
symmetrical, i.e.  ( ) i,11 ;1 ree=  and  ( ) i,22 ;1 ree= , the equations simplify to: 













The following results can be summarised: 
•  Demand shocks only have an impact on the overall results if demand shocks are not 
perfectly synchronized. 
•  In the absence of macroeconomic shocks the inflation rate is equal to the inflation target 
and the output gap is equal to zero. 
•  The results are qualatively similar to those derived in the main part of the text. 
 
In order to compare the results somewhat deeper we compute the value for the reduced form 
coefficients given our standard calibrations and compare them with those derived in the main 
text. Without going into detail the tables impressively demonstrate that the internalisation of the 
aggregate inflation rate does not alter the quantative results significantly. 
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Table 11: The parameters of the fiscal stance equation 
( ) i11i2i,232 gqqq =e-e+e+e    
Main part  Appendix 
q1  0.733  0.802 
q2  -0.293  -02143 
q3  0.846  1.4 
Calibration: b0.4;d0.34;0.5;0.5 ==l=j=k=  
 
Table 12: The parameters of the output gap equation 
( ) i11i223i,2 yqqq =e-e+e+e    
Main part  Appendix 
q1  0.733  0.69314 
q2  -0.846  -0.319 
q3  0.293  0.867 
Calibration: b0.4;d0.34;0.5;0.5 ==l=j=k=  
 
Table 13: The parameters of the inflation equation 
( ) i011i2i,232 qqq p=p+e-e+e+e    
Main part  Appendix 
q1  0.250  0.2357 
q2  -0.287  -0.282; 
q3  1.10  1.094 
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